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In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis the discussion on preventive regulatory policies
has generally overlooked the role of different business models and goals. Credit institutions
with mutual objectives are a case in point that is the object of this study, which focuses on
the relationship between competition and financial stability in European cooperative bank-
ing between 2006 and 2014. Our results show that there exists a hump-shaped relationship
between market power and stability, particularly in the loan market. Interestingly, we also
find that, diversification in assets and liabilities significantly increases cooperative banks’
solvency.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Cooperative banks have a specific business model in that their customers are also the members of these credit unions.
They represent a sizeable portion of the European banking industry. For example, in Austria they represent 29% of the indus-
try’s market share, in Germany 51%, in Italy 61% and in Spain 31%. They also count for a large percentage of loans to the small
and medium sized companies in the markets where they operate. They are, however, generally smaller than the average
commercial bank. In terms of asset size the average cooperative bank in Austria is one-half the size of the average commer-
cial bank, in Germany it is one-fifth the size, in Italy one-fourth the size, and in Spain the figure is one-tenth.1 Their size and
market niche make them important banking players for smoothing the effects of tight monetary policy (Ferri et al., 2014) and
for local economic development (Hakenes et al., 2015). Yet, their importance and specific business model has only begun to
receive attention from pundits, regulators and policy makers (Kalmi, 2007) when designing policies to increase the resilience
of the European banking market.
Recent regulatory developments in Europe have begun to pay attention to the individual stability of cooperative banks.
National bank supervisors maintain the responsibility of supervising Less Significant Institutions (LSI) in cooperation with
the European Central Bank. Whenever a bank is likely to fail or declared insolvent, an EU-level resolution authority – the? J. Int.
2 E. Clark et al. / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (2017) xxx–xxxSingle Resolution Mechanism – is commended to ensure the orderly resolution of the failing credit institution. The two pil-
lars for the orderly resolution of distressed banks rely on the correct assessment of the individual stability of the LSI, the
majority of which in Europe are cooperative banks.
Using a large sample of 1535 cooperative banks in European countries between 2006 and 2014 that covers 64% of the
overall cooperative banking sample worldwide, we empirically assess the relationship between competition, risk preferences
and market structure in cooperative banking. While this issue has been widely debated and investigated by both policymak-
ers and academics for commercial banking, only a handful of studies exist for the cooperative banking industry (see for
example Presbitero and Zazzaro 2011; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). Ours is the first to consider the specific features related
to the cooperative business model.
The theoretical literature on bank stability proposes two contentious views that are based on different premises, but nei-
ther really fit the cooperative business model. The competition-fragility view (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990) hinges on the
risk-taking incentives of shareholders subsequent to the decline in bank franchise value. This channel is particularly weak
in cooperative banks as customers are also members of these credit institutions (Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). Moreover, coop-
erative banks create value through the unique nature of their relationships not only with the borrowers, but also with the
local environment where they operate. The competition-stability view (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005; De Nicolo and Lucchetta,
2009) focuses on the lending channel and advocates that, in a classical asymmetric framework, higher interest rate charges
exacerbate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. It follows that lower competition is associated with higher risk
in the credit portfolio leading to higher likelihood of bank insolvency. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) extend this rea-
soning by allowing for imperfect correlation of loan defaults. The authors suggest the existence of two separate effects: a
margin effect due to lower prices charged to customers in more competitive markets and a risk-shifting effect favoured
by the opacity of the banking business that generates asymmetric information problems. The theoretical and numerical pre-
diction is that there exists a U-shaped relationship between the number of banks and the probability of bank failure (see for
example, Jiménez et al., 2013). The reasoning leaves out important aspects for cooperative banks, namely the efficiency in the
lending process and the role of competition in the market for deposits. Cooperative banks are constrained in the availability
of funding sources as they cannot easily either raise capital or access the wholesale funding market.
In one study that focuses on the cooperative banking sector Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011) suggest that in markets dom-
inated by cooperative banks, the increase in competition leads to higher investments in building long-lasting relationships
with customers (i.e., relationship lending). If this is the case, we can speculate that competition increases bank stability
because of higher investments in collecting information, screening and monitoring. Eventually, cooperative banks subject
to competitive pressures may witness an improvement in the credit quality of their portfolio. In line with this prediction,
Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) show that in five cooperative banking markets in Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Italy and
Spain) banking competition increases individual bank stability. Liu et al., (2013) focus on regional banking in Europe includ-
ing cooperative banks and find, similarly to Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), a non-linear relationship between compe-
tition and stability.
Other studies attempt to address the financial stability of cooperative banks and their contribution to the overall systemic
stability. Hesse and Cihák (2007) argue that cooperative banks are more stable than commercial banks due to the lower vari-
ability of the cooperative banks’ returns. Moreover, in line with the reasoning in Ayadi et al., (2010), Hesse and Cihák (2007)
find that banking systems characterised by a higher share of cooperative banks are more stable. Mercieca et al., (2007) anal-
yse the benefits of income diversification in terms of bank profitability. The authors investigate small European banks over
the period 1997–2003 and find that there are no direct diversification benefits in terms of performance. Goddard et al.,
(2008) suggest that a diversification strategy brings positive effects depending on size. The authors analyse a sample of credit
unions in the United States between 1993 and 2004 and show that diversification strategies are more effective for the largest
credit unions only and lead to higher returns unadjusted for risk. In contrast, Köhler (2015) finds that cooperative banks may
become significantly sounder through the benefits of income diversification. In addition, the author finds that retail-oriented
credit institutions become less stable if they increase the share of non-deposit funding.
The innovation in this paper is that for the first time (to the best of our knowledge) the specific cooperative business
model is incorporated in the testing of the relationship between competition and stability. To this end, we look at the coop-
eratives’ two major markets – the market for deposits and the market for loans. We then use a modified Lerner index to mea-
sure the market power of each cooperative in each market. We also test for the significance of diversification captured in
three dimensions: assets, deposits and liabilities. Finally, we look at the risk exposure at the bank level as a significant deter-
minant of bank soundness and market stability, and test whether there are non-linear relationships between market power
and individual bank soundness. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that market power increases individual bank sta-
bility, but the relationship is non-linear. When we analyse the market for loans and deposits separately, we find that most of
the individual bank stability derives from market power in the loan market. We do not find conclusive evidence for market
power in the deposit market. Second, we show that cooperative bank solvency is positively related to the degree of diver-
sification in both assets and liabilities.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and variables employed in the analysis. In
section 3, we discuss the empirical approach. Section 4 summarises the results from the estimations and the robustness
checks. Section 5 concludes.Please cite this article in press as: Clark, E., et al. Cooperative banks: What do we know about competition and risk preferences? J. Int.
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Bank financial statements are taken from the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database. We restrict our analysis to countries in
the European Union where data is available for Cooperative banks over the period 2006 to 2014. We select cooperative banks
according to Bankscope database definition.
We apply a number of selection criteria to arrive at our final sample. To avoid duplication, we consider unconsolidated
data only. We also omit banks for which relevant information is not available (i.e., total assets and total equity) and for which
we have information for fewer than three consecutive years, as our risk measure is computed over rolling windows hence we
need a minimum number of observations. We also exclude banks where we do not have the complete information to esti-
mate our measures of market power. Lastly we drop countries for which cooperative banks’ market share in the banking
industry is less than 25%. This yields a sample of around 11,900 observations for 1193 cooperative banks distributed in four
European countries.2 The sample is unbalanced and banks are mainly concentrated in two countries – Germany and Italy, -
accounting for 62% and 30%, of the total observations, respectively. Table 1 reports the key indicators for the cooperative banks
in the different countries.
We notice that in our sample Austria counts with the biggest cooperative banks in terms of assets whilst Italy on average
shows the smallest. On average, Italy and Spain have the highest percentage of loans to total assets and more generally, coop-
erative banks invest 65 per cent of the total assets in loans. Deposits are the biggest source of funding for cooperative banks
though this is not the case in Italy where Banche Popolari use alternative sources of funding. On average, the leverage ratio
computed as equity to total assets is 8.8 per cent denoting a high level of capitalization compared to recent regulatory pro-
posals in the European Countries (as for instance, a maximum leverage ratio of 4.95 per cent in boom times proposed by the
Bank of England in the UK). Interest income is the main source of revenues standing at almost 80 per cent of total income.
A comprehensive set of variables is considered in the analysis to control for the effect of other factors on the relationship
between risk and competition. We include variables such as diversification proxies, and bank-specific variables that can
directly affect the relationship between stability and competition. Below, we first describe the main variables of interest
in our analysis – the Lerner Index and bank stability – and then the other variables we include in the estimation.
2.1. Measuring competition and market structure
We estimate competition using the Lerner Index of Monopoly Power (LER). This indicator represents the extent to which
market power allows firms to earn relative margins (price minus marginal cost divided by the price). We explicitly recognise
that the core products offered by cooperative banks are interest-bearing assets and interest-bearing liabilities. We therefore
investigate separately the different patterns and determinants of the degree of non-competitive behaviour in the two sep-
arate markets. The specification is as follows (where subscripts i, and t denote bank and time period):2 The
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ac þ eit ; ð2Þwhere ln(C) is the natural logarithm of total cost; W are the three input prices: price of labour, price of funding and price of
physical capital. Y are two outputs: Y1 are interest-bearing assets obtained as the sum of net loans, loans and advances to
banks and reverse repos and cash collateral; Y2 are interest-bearing liabilities obtained as total funding excluding derivatives
and trading liabilities; Tr is a time trend; ac are country fixed effects; e are the errors composed by a random component (vj)
and a systematic deviance from optimal cost due to inefficiency (uj).3 Symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices
restrictions are imposed. As in Forssbæck and Shehzad (2015), the operating marginal costs for Y1 and Y2 are derived using
the following two equations:countries remaining after applying our selection criteria are Austria, Germany, Italy, and Spain.
random component (v j) is assumed to be identically independently distributed (i.i.d.) with 0 mean and constant variance (r2V ). The inefficiency term
i.d. with half-normal distribution and variance (r2U) independent of the v j ’s.
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Table 1
Key indicators of cooperative banking sector.
Country Assets Loans Deposits Short-term liabilities Equity Net operating income Interest income Personnel Expenses
Austria 1,016,917 58.9% 70.3% 88.2% 7.2% 0.4% 75.7% 39.0%
Germany 962,271 57.2% 75.6% 88.6% 7.4% 0.8% 79.0% 36.6%
Italy 712,395 64.6% 51.2% 62.1% 11.6% 0.6% 82.6% 32.9%
Spain 941,591 64.9% 79.4% 87.5% 10.1% 0.6% 88.9% 23.3%
Total 888,996 59.8% 68.2% 80.6% 8.8% 0.7% 80.3% 35.1%
This table presents the average country values of key descriptive indicators for cooperative banks. Total assets are in thousand dollars. Net loans, deposits,
short-term liabilities, equities and net operating income are expressed in percentage of total assets. The interest income and the personnel expenses are
expressed in percentage of total income. Source: own calculation using data from Bankscope.
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: ð4Þmc1 and mc2 are obtained from Eqs. (3) and (4) and then substituted into Eq. (1) to calculate the Lerner Indexes for bank i at
time t, thereby giving us the dynamic change in market power across banks over time.LERLit ¼ rLit  rclt mc1itð ÞrLit ; and ð5Þ
LERDit ¼ rct  rDit mc2itð ÞrDit : ð6Þwhere rL and rD are the individual bank lending and deposit rates, respectively; rc are the country interest rate on overnight
deposits.
2.2. Measuring risk exposure
We employ different measures of risk in order to account for cooperative banks’ risk preferences, namely, bank solvency,
credit risk and risk-adjusted performance. The Z-index is an indicator of overall bank solvency that has been used extensively
in banking studies (e.g., Beck et al., 2013; Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2015). This measure provides an indication of the number
of standard deviations by which returns have to diminish in order to deplete the equity of a bank. Following Mare et al.
(2017), we compute the Z-Index as it follows:Z  Indexi;t ¼
lROA;t þ E=TAi;T
rROA;t
; with t 2 f1;2; . . . ;Tg ð7Þwhere lROA is the moving mean return on assets (ROA) computed using the past and current information for each period;4 E/
TA is the ratio equity to total assets for the current period (t); rROA is the moving standard deviation of ROA computed using the
past and current information for each period. The Z-index is a measure of bank solvency. Higher values imply a higher degree of
soundness.
In order to gain a broader understanding of the risk profile of cooperative banks, we consider two other sources of risk.
First, since cooperative banks mainly perform the traditional lending function (i.e., provision of loans), we look at credit risk.
To this end, we use two financial ratios widely used in the literature that proxy for credit risk. The ratio of loan-loss reserves
to gross loans to capture both past performance and the expectation of future performance (Abedifar et al., 2013) as the
numerator is a stock measure of current and expected loan losses. The ratio of loan-loss provisions to gross loans account
for the flow of losses in a specific year or the impact of past credit risk exposures on the current income statement.
Second, we look at performance risk. To this end, we followMercieca et al., (2007) and Turk Ariss (2010) and compute two
risk-adjusted performance measures, the risk adjusted return on assets and the risk adjusted returns on equity:RORROA ¼
lROA;t
rROA;t
; with t 2 f1;2; . . . ;Tg ð8Þ
RORROE ¼
lROE;t
rROE;t
; with t 2 1;2; . . . ;Tf g ð9Þinstance, in order to compute the mean ROA for year 2004, the average ROA is computed over the period 2005–2004.
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moving mean of ROA; rROA is the moving standard deviation of ROA; lROE is the moving mean return on equity (ROE); rROA
is the moving standard deviation of ROE.
2.3. Diversification measures and control variables
The evidence on the impact of diversification in banking industry is somewhat mixed. Some recent studies suggest that
costs may outweigh benefits when banks choose to diversify their product offerings. For example, DeYoung and Roland
(2001), Stiroh (2004) and Berger et al., (2010) find that diversification is negatively linked to performance.5 The studies above
focus mainly on commercial banking, but what about cooperative banks? So, one of the objectives of our study is to investigate
the role of asset and liability diversification in the explanation of cooperative banking stability. We focus on diversification in
assets, in customer deposits, and in sources of funding. Following Berger et al., (2010), we compute three measures of bank
diversification, asset diversification (DIVASSET), deposit diversification (DIVDEPO) and liability diversification (DIVLIAB):5 Rec
Please
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ð12ÞWe also incorporate in the main model a vector X of covariates that describe bank-specific characteristics and the
macroeconomic environment (see for example, Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Carbó et al., 2009; and Fernandez de Guevara
et al., 2005). The size variable is computed as the natural logarithm of bank total assets and it captures cost advantages asso-
ciated with size and market power associated with size. The financial leverage ratio is built as total liabilities to total equity.
Lastly, we control for macroeconomic variables that are expected to influence the relationship between risk preferences and
competition. These include the average unemployment rate for the total population and the inflation rate. A summary of the
variables used for the empirical investigation is provided in Table 2. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the main
variables of interest for the aggregate sample over the observed time period.
3. Empirical approach
We specify the following model to investigate the relationship between solvency risk, market power and diversification in
cooperative banking:Riski;t ¼ f Competitioni;t;Diversificationi;t;Xi;j;t
 
; ð13Þ
where the subscripts i, j and t denote the bank, the country and the time dimension, respectively. In line with previous stud-
ies (for instance, Beck et al., 2013), we analyse the economic causality using panel fixed-effects techniques. We specify the
following relationship:Riski;t ¼ ai þ ct þ b1Compi;t þ b2Comp2i;t þ
X3
h¼1
xhDivh;i;t þ
X3
k¼1
dkXk;i;t þ
X2
m¼1
mmMm;c;t þ ei;t ; ð14Þwhere Risk is a risk measure: Z-index; loan-loss provisions (or loan i charges) to gross loans; the risk-adjusted return on
assets; and the risk-adjusted return on equity. Comp is the Lerner Index; Div are the three diversification measures
(h 2 f1;2;3g): diversification in assets, diversification in customer deposits and diversification in sources of funding. X is
the vector of bank-level fundamentals (k 2 f1;2;3g), namely size, financial leverage and the categorical variable for listed
institutions; M (m 2 f1;2g) are the unemployment rate and the inflation rate; c are year fixed-effects; a are bank fixed
effects; e indicates robust standard errors.
We include the squared term of the Lerner Index in our model as we want to capture non-linear effects running from
market power on individual bank stability. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) suggest that this is important to capture both
the margin effect and the risk-shifting effect. As a preliminary result, Fig. 1 reports the predicted values obtained from a lin-ent study by Doumpos et al., (2016) find that effect of diversification is not as straightforward as suggested before.
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Table 2
Variables definition.
Variables Symbol Definition and calculation method
Risk measures
Z-Index ZINDEX It is built as the sum of bank’s average return on assets (ROA) and bank’s average equity ratio (equity over total
assets) divided by the standard deviation of ROA computed for each bank per year.
Loan loss
provision ratio
LLPTL It is built as net impairment charge in relation to the bank’s loans and advances as well as off-balance sheet items
during the period as percentage of total gross loans
Loan loss reserves
ratio
LLRTL It is built as reserve against possible losses on impaired or non-performing loans as percentage of total gross loans
Risk-adjusted
ROA
RORROA Following Turk-Arris (2010), it is built as the bank’s average return on assets (ROA) divided by the bank’s standard
deviation of ROA.
Risk-adjusted ROE RORROE Following Turk-Arris (2010), it is built as the bank’s average return on equity (ROE) divided by the bank’s standard
deviation of ROE.
Market power
measure
Lerner Index LER It represents the extent to which market power allows the bank to fix a price (P) above its marginal cost (MC).
Diversification
measures
Asset
diversification
DIVASSET It is built as the sum of the percentage squares (with respect to total assets) of net loans, loans and advances to
banks, total securities, cash and due from banks and fixed assets. The ratio is computed per each bank in each year.
Deposit
diversification
DIVDEPO It is built as the sum of the percentage squares (with respect to to total deposits) of customer deposits current,
savings and term. The ratio is computed per each bank in each year.
Liabilities
diversification
DIVLIAB It is built as the sum of the percentage squares (with respect to to total liabilities) of total customer deposits,
deposits from banks, total long term funding, other liabilities and total equity. The ratio is computed per each bank
in each year.
Control variables
Size ln_TOTA It is built as the natural logarithm of total assets.
Financial leverage FL It is built as total liabilities to total equity.
Unemployment
rate
UNEMP It is the monthly average rate in December of the unemployment rate.
Inflation rate HICP It is the annual percentage change in the harmonized consumer price index.
This table reports the name, symbol and definition of the variables employed in the analysis. The source of data is Bureau van Dijk Bankscope and the World
Bank.
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significant and there appears to be a hump-shaped relationship between stability and market power.4. Results
We estimate a panel fixed effects model in order to examine the relationship between competition (measured by LER) and
cooperative banks’ risk while controlling for diversification, bank-level fundamentals and macro variables. We report the
results derived from the estimation of Eq. (14) in Table 4.
Our main variables of interest are the Lerner index and the diversification measures. Contrary to Fiordelisi and Mare
(2014), we find that market power is positively related to bank stability though there exists a hump-shaped relationship sig-
nalled by the negative coefficients of the squared term (Table 4, column 2, row Lerner SQ). We ascribe this difference to the
different model specification (e.g., linear relationship between stability and competition), sample and time period (i.e., 1998–
2009 vs 2006–2014). The coefficients on our time dummies6 signal a decrease in stability over time, probably due 2007–2009
global financial crises. Therefore, we may speculate that the margin effect (i.e., increase in competition decreases margins on
loans) could take a toll on individual bank stability as high market power may contribute to a build-up of extra-capital buffers
to absorb systemic shocks (Fiordelisi et al., 2015), which then in turn could increase individual bank stability in times of crisis.
Turning to the results for the loans and deposits market, we notice a positive relationship between loan market power and indi-
vidual bank stability. The quadratic terms appear to be not statistically significant in all the regressions (Table 4, Columns 3, 4
and 7). We do not find the same mechanism at work for the deposit market as the coefficients are statistically insignificant at
the 10 percent level in two of the three specifications. This is also true for all the squared terms.
Further, by looking at the coefficients for both deposit and liabilities diversification we find that they are positive and sta-
tistically significant at one per cent or more (Table 4), implying that when cooperative banks employ asset diversification
strategies, they increase the individual resilience due to higher margin (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010). This is also true
if cooperative banks strike the right balance in the diversification of their liabilities.6 For the sake of space, we do not report the coefficient of the time fixed-effects in Tables 4–6. Results are available from the authors upon request and show
that, taking as a reference year 2006, cooperative banks’ stability has decreased over time.
Please cite this article in press as: Clark, E., et al. Cooperative banks: What do we know about competition and risk preferences? J. Int.
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Table 3
Summary statistics.
Panel A: Key Descriptive statistics
Variable Symbol Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Z-Index ZINDEX 10,961 104.492 188.514 4.456 1778.311
Loan loss provision ratio LLPTL 10,925 0.006 0.010 0.035 0.049
Loan-loss reserves to gross loans LLRTL 5051 0.030 0.027 0.000 0.152
Risk-adjusted ROA RORROA 10,961 5.076 47.610 71.418 4444.042
Risk-adjusted ROE RORROE 10,946 5.097 99.589 5.190 10203.770
Lerner Index LER 10,961 0.374 0.121 0.031 0.732
Asset diversification DIVASSET 10,961 0.471 0.099 0.140 0.934
Deposit diversification DIVDEPO 10,961 0.572 0.248 0.000 1.000
Liabilities diversification DIVLIAB 10,961 0.539 0.144 0.116 1.045
Size ln_TOTA 10,961 13.053 1.109 8.902 17.895
Financial leverage FL 10,961 11.928 4.538 0.159 79.381
Unemployment rate UNEMP 10,961 7.743 3.296 4.300 26.000
Inflation rate HICP 10,961 1.812 0.938 0.200 4.100
Panel B: Correlations
ZINDEX 1
LLPTL 0.032 1
LLRTL 0.093 0.597 1
RORROA 0.326 0.002 0.006 1
RORROE 0.071 0.003 0.021 0.027 1
LER 0.056 0.171 0.302 0.003 0.004 1
MKT LOANS 0.061 0.074 0.071 0.006 0.001 0.143 1
MKT DEP 0.037 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.086 0.876 1
MKT ASSET 0.041 0.032 0.055 0.007 0.000 0.084 0.795 0.788 1
DIVASSET 0.092 0.087 0.262 0.005 0.004 0.476 0.211 0.085 0.043 1
DIVDEPO 0.123 0.166 0.160 0.020 0.013 0.167 0.183 0.036 0.056 0.353 1
DIVLIAB 0.158 0.242 0.278 0.030 0.004 0.112 0.197 0.007 0.115 0.321 0.539 1
ln_TOTA 0.072 0.008 0.022 0.024 0.001 0.025 0.502 0.564 0.452 0.093 0.086 0.123 1
FL 0.026 0.075 0.029 0.005 0.009 0.028 0.025 0.158 0.146 0.231 0.468 0.355 0.268 1
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our sample of cooperative banks in the European banking system between 2006 and 2014 for the main
variables used in the model.
Fig. 1. Lerner index and Z-score.
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with a smaller equity base to protect against losses on risky assets. The negative coefficient on unemployment reflects
the increase in the default rate caused by the contraction of the reimbursing capacity of businesses and households as well
as a material reduction of demand for new loans, which could lead to a significant deterioration of the ratio between the
interest bearing interest assets and liabilities. Finally, the significant negative coefficient on inflation suggests that at least
part of the inflation was unanticipated. If inflation is anticipated it will be reflected in the interest rates and should have little
or no material effect on bank values and stability. However, if it is unanticipated, the unexpected increase in the price levelPlease cite this article in press as: Clark, E., et al. Cooperative banks: What do we know about competition and risk preferences? J. Int.
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Table 4
Estimation results for bank solvency.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ
Lernert-1 0.603*** 1.178***
(0.092) (0.288)
LernerSQt-1 0.796**
(0.395)
Lerner Loanst-1 0.581*** 1.917** 1.689*
(0.201) (0.946) (0.939)
LernerSQ Loanst-1 0.930 0.798
(0.623) (0.619)
Lerner Depositst-1 0.066*** 0.061 0.041
(0.016) (0.083) (0.081)
LernerSQ Depositst-1 0.015 0.012
(0.009) (0.009)
Asset diversificationt-1 0.163 0.112 0.346** 0.347** 0.323** 0.334** 0.297**
(0.148) (0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.150) (0.151) (0.150)
Deposit diversificationt-1 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.228*** 0.235*** 0.264*** 0.262*** 0.266***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Liabilities diversificationt-1 0.356** 0.342** 0.275* 0.269* 0.334** 0.312** 0.308**
(0.144) (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.144) (0.143)
Sizet-1 0.050 0.051 0.069 0.077 0.059 0.070 0.056
(0.071) (0.070) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Financial leveraget-1 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemploymentt-1 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Inflationt-1 0.107*** 0.109*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.111***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant 4.304*** 4.181*** 4.047*** 3.486*** 4.712*** 4.367*** 3.748***
(0.920) (0.922) (0.930) (0.987) (0.925) (0.929) (0.983)
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 9678 9678 9678 9678 9678 9678 9678
R-squared 0.298 0.298 0.292 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.295
Number of BANKID 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260
This table reports the results from the estimation of Eq. (14). We use a panel fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank
level. The sample includes the European cooperative banks in EU5 over the period 2006–2014. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels at the
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
Table 5
Estimation results using different risk measures.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables LLPTLi LLPTLi LLRTLi LLRTLi lnRORroa lnRORroa lnRORroe lnRORroe
Lernert-1 0.024*** 0.034** 1.407*** 1.403***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.430) (0.497)
LernerSQt-1 0.025*** 0.096*** 0.986* 0.948
(0.009) (0.024) (0.570) (0.625)
Lerner Loanst-1 0.032** 0.077 1.531 1.437
(0.014) (0.059) (1.249) (1.365)
LernerSQ Loanst-1 0.017* 0.085** -0.795 0.849
(0.010) (0.038) (0.814) (0.886)
Lerner Depositst-1 0.006*** 0.010** 0.038 0.132
(0.001) (0.005) (0.127) (0.140)
LernerSQ Depositst-1 0.001*** 0.001 0.010 0.021
(0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.017)
Asset diversificationt-1 0.004* 0.006** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.209 0.139 0.148
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.214) (0.223) (0.215) (0.227)
Deposit diversificationt-1 0.005*** 0.004** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.137 0.152 0.254 0.268
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.108) (0.111) (0.190) (0.181)
Liabilities diversificationt-1 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.893*** 0.838*** 0.607*** 0.533***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.202) (0.197) (0.195) (0.196)
Sizet-1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.023 0.004 0.043
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.107) (0.105) (0.098) (0.105)
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Table 5 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables LLPTLi LLPTLi LLRTLi LLRTLi lnRORroa lnRORroa lnRORroe lnRORroe
Financial leveraget-1 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Unemploymentt-1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.062***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Inflationt-1 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.154*** 0.165***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026)
Constant 0.048*** 0.035** 0.219*** 0.272*** 0.957 0.527 0.979 0.312
(0.013) (0.014) (0.066) (0.076) (1.325) (1.461) (1.296) (1.586)
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 9657 9657 4675 4675 9678 9678 9673 9673
R-squared 0.249 0.251 0.567 0.569 0.213 0.209 0.195 0.191
Number of BANKID 1259 1259 1114 1114 1260 1260 1259M 1259
This table reports the results from the estimation of Eq. (14). We use a panel fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank
level. The sample includes the European banks in EU5 over the period 2006–2014. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels at the 10%, 5% and
1% respectively. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
Table 6
Estimation results for bank solvency (no Germany or no Italy).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ
Lernert-1 1.803*** 0.969**
(0.380) (0.390)
LernerSQ t-1 1.110** 0.807
(0.514) (0.502)
Lerner Loans t-1 7.449*** 1.015
(1.371) (1.092)
LernerSQ Loans t-1 4.394*** 1.232*
(0.922) (0.716)
Lerner Deposits t-1 0.205 0.189**
(0.129) (0.089)
LernerSQ Deposits t-1 0.024* 0.011
(0.014) (0.010)
Asset diversification t-1 0.524*** 0.007 0.317 0.434**
(0.181) (0.179) (0.198) (0.202)
Deposit diversification t-1 0.259*** 0.237** 0.206** 0.212**
(0.091) (0.092) (0.089) (0.089)
Liabilities diversification t-1 0.791*** 0.490*** 0.235 0.265
(0.154) (0.157) (0.169) (0.166)
Size t-1 0.182*** 0.184*** 0.045 0.017
(0.028) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034)
Financial leverage t-1 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Unemployment t-1 0.012* 0.005 0.053*** 0.056***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Inflation t-1 0.012 0.017 0.145*** 0.133***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.042) (0.040)
Constant 1.261*** 1.316* 4.629*** 5.753***
(0.406) (0.714) (0.490) (0.699)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 3718 3718 6769 6769
R-squared 0.452 0.452 0.198 0.206
Number of BANKID 488 488 880 880
This table reports the results from the estimation of Eq. (14). We use a panel fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank
level. In column (1) and (2), German banks are excluded from the estimation; in column (3) and (4), Italian banks are excluded from the estimation. The
symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
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Table 7
Estimation results for bank solvency (including CAMELS indicators).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ lnZ
Lernert-1 0.709*** 1.157***
(0.099) (0.270)
LernerSQt-1 0.615
(0.386)
Lerner Loanst-1 0.607*** 1.761** 1.600*
(0.198) (0.879) (0.870)
LernerSQ Loanst-1 0.803 0.709
(0.592) (0.588)
Lerner Depositst-1 0.069*** 0.028 0.006
(0.017) (0.082) (0.080)
LernerSQ Depositst-1 0.011 0.009
(0.009) (0.009)
Asset diversificationt-1 0.209 0.166 0.421*** 0.420*** 0.390** 0.398** 0.363**
(0.152) (0.150) (0.153) (0.153) (0.155) (0.156) (0.155)
Deposit diversificationt-1 0.104 0.110 0.101 0.111 0.141* 0.140* 0.141*
(0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080)
Liabilities diversificationt-1 0.399*** 0.387*** 0.303** 0.296** 0.360** 0.343** 0.342**
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
Sizet-1 0.038 0.040 0.066 0.075 0.060 0.067 0.050
(0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073)
Financial leveraget-1 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Unemploymentt-1 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.052***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Inflationt-1 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.111*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
L.Cap_adequacy 2.345** 2.348** 1.756* 1.760* 2.199** 2.176** 2.140*
(1.093) (1.084) (1.023) (1.020) (1.111) (1.107) (1.098)
L.Asset_quality 2.604*** 2.604*** 1.967*** 1.911*** 1.786*** 1.724*** 1.900***
(0.597) (0.596) (0.585) (0.582) (0.596) (0.595) (0.596)
L.Mngmt_quality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.Earnings 0.902 0.923* 0.197 0.226 0.143 0.162 0.307
(0.557) (0.551) (0.909) (0.911) (0.901) (0.883) (0.832)
L.Liquidity 0.389 0.434 0.025 0.053 0.158 0.185 0.389
(1.038) (1.039) (1.051) (1.051) (1.079) (1.074) (1.062)
L.Sensitivity_MktRisk 0.272*** 0.261*** 0.268*** 0.260*** 0.249*** 0.245*** 0.254***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084)
Constant 4.067*** 3.958*** 3.778*** 3.278*** 4.383*** 4.144*** 3.591***
(0.958) (0.958) (0.974) (1.009) (0.974) (0.980) (1.014)
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 9575 9575 9575 9575 9575 9575 9575
R-squared 0.307 0.308 0.300 0.300 0.301 0.301 0.303
Number of BANKID 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259 1259
This table reports the results from the estimation of Eq. (14) including CAMELS indicators. We use a panel fixed effects model with robust standard errors
clustered at the individual bank level. The sample includes the European cooperative banks in EU5 over the period 2006–2014. The symbols *, **, and ***
represent significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
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are typically larger than nominal liabilities, bank owners typically lose wealth when there is unanticipated inflation.
The empirical literature on the nexus of competition and stability underlines potential endogeneity issues in the estima-
tion of Eq. (14) (see for example Koetter et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2013; and Anginer et al., 2014). We tackle this issue by
employing different dependent variables that capture diverse aspects of cooperative banks’ risk exposure. The results, dis-
played in Table 5, are qualitatively the same and support the non-linearity in the relationship between market power and
individual cooperative banks’ stability. Furthermore, the differentiation between the market power in the loans and deposits
market is again important to explain cooperative banks’ exposure to risk. Diversification measures are again statistically sig-
nificant but negatively related to increases in loan loss provisions.4.1. Robustness checks
In order to further confirm the aforementioned findings, we conduct some additional robustness checks. We recognise
that two countries dominate the sample and investigate whether this feature can affect the robustness of our results. So,Please cite this article in press as: Clark, E., et al. Cooperative banks: What do we know about competition and risk preferences? J. Int.
Financ. Markets Inst. Money (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2017.09.008
Table 8
Estimation results using different risk measures (including CAMELS indicators).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables LLPTLi LLPTLi LLRTLi LLRTLi lnRORroa lnRORroa lnRORroe lnRORroe
Lernert-1 0.019*** 0.044*** 1.614*** 1.781***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.417) (0.495)
LernerSQt-1 0.023*** 0.080*** 1.132** 1.147*
(0.009) (0.024) (0.570) (0.621)
Lerner Loanst-1 0.035** 0.105* 1.655 1.505
(0.014) (0.056) (1.190) (1.326)
LernerSQ Loanst-1 0.021** 0.090** 0.838 0.805
(0.010) (0.036) (0.788) (0.856)
Lerner Depositst-1 0.005*** 0.009** 0.004 0.103
(0.001) (0.004) (0.131) (0.146)
LernerSQ Depositst-1 0.000*** 0.001 0.005 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.017)
Asset diversificationt-1 0.005* 0.005** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.020 0.312 0.160 0.188
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.219) (0.227) (0.222) (0.232)
Deposit diversificationt-1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.107 0.125 0.172 0.200
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.116) (0.113) (0.178) (0.169)
Liabilities diversificationt-1 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.847*** 0.781*** 0.596*** 0.506**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.201) (0.198) (0.198) (0.197)
Sizet-1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.010** 0.012** 0.023 0.054 0.054 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.108) (0.106) (0.097) (0.096)
Financial leveraget-1 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.014 0.013 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
Unemploymentt-1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.061*** 0.067***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Inflationt-1 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.125*** 0.134*** 0.149*** 0.162***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027)
L.Cap_adequacy 0.014 0.019 0.202*** 0.190*** 1.572 1.154 2.391* 1.951
(0.014) (0.014) (0.054) (0.055) (2.022) (2.057) (1.239) (1.260)
L.Asset_quality 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.315*** 0.310*** 2.502** 1.646 1.135 0.003
(0.024) (0.024) (0.044) (0.044) (1.213) (1.249) (1.546) (1.594)
L.Mngmt_quality 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.Earnings 0.020 0.017 0.383*** 0.473*** 0.253 0.792 5.016*** 3.840**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.124) (0.103) (0.839) (0.750) (1.057) (1.552)
L.Liquidity 0.018 0.015 0.067 0.057 1.143 1.454 0.334 0.000
(0.020) (0.019) (0.045) (0.046) (1.544) (1.569) (1.503) (1.483)
L.Sensitivity_MktRisk 0.003* 0.003* 0.000 0.001 0.048 0.047 0.023 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.144) (0.146) (0.144) (0.146)
Constant 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.212*** 0.269*** 0.408 0.027 1.528 0.952
(0.014) (0.016) (0.067) (0.077) (1.413) (1.522) (1.324) (1.433)
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 9565 9565 4664 4664 9575 9575 9570 9570
R-squared 0.264 0.266 0.598 0.603 0.221 0.215 0.204 0.197
Number of BANKID 1259 1259 1114 1114 1259 1259 1258 1258
This table reports the results from the estimation of Eq. (14). We use a panel fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank
level. The sample includes the European banks in EU5 over the period 2006–2014. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels at the 10%, 5% and
1% respectively. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.
E. Clark et al. / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 11we estimate Eq. (14) by excluding German banks (Table 6, columns 1 and 2) or by excluding Italian banks (Table 6, columns 3
and 4) from our analysis. We find that the Lerner Index remains highly significant and confirm the hump-shaped relationship
in the loans market when German or Italian banks are excluded. In addition, the diversification measures are still statistically
significant supporting our view that the diversifications of assets as well as the diversification of liabilities are important
determinants of cooperative bank stability.
We also extend our analysis to include the CAMELS indicators in our main model (14). We thank the referee for this useful
suggestion. Tables 7 and 8 present additional variables of interest. In all cases, the results remain statistically and econom-
ically significant, consistent with our main findings, and suggesting that these concerns do not drive our main results. The
results for CAMELS indicators are similar to those found in the literature (see for example, Acharya et al. (2017), Bassett et al.
(2015) and Duchin and Sosyura, 2014).
5. Conclusions
Cooperative banks are key credit institutions for the sustainable development of local economies. Despite their
importance, only a few studies have assessed the relationship between competition and the individual financial stabilityPlease cite this article in press as: Clark, E., et al. Cooperative banks: What do we know about competition and risk preferences? J. Int.
Financ. Markets Inst. Money (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2017.09.008
12 E. Clark et al. / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money xxx (2017) xxx–xxxof European cooperative banks. Moreover, these credit institutions deserve specific treatment for the distinctive features that
characterize their business model.
Our paper empirically advances the literature by analysing a large sample of cooperative banks in the European Union
between 2006 and 2014. We employ a modified Lerner index to disentangle the market power in loans and deposits and
account for the specific business model orientation of cooperative banks. We also test whether there exists a non-linear rela-
tionship between competition and stability in cooperative banking. In addition, we include in the analysis diversification
measures that are better able to explain the exposure to different risk dimensions.
We find that competition decreases individual bank stability but that there exists a hump-shaped relationship, probably
driven by market power in the loans market. Market power in the deposits market appears to be linearly and positively
related to bank solvency. Diversification measures are significantly and positively related to individual bank stability. Overall
our findings show that it is tantamount to carefully account for cooperative banks’ specific features whilst assessing the rela-
tionship between market power and stability in cooperative banking.
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